Setbacks or Success in Foreign Policy?
The Internet is a source of protest, at least that’s the way the Chinese government sees it. As it allows for far-reaching, fast-spreading, citizen-to-citizen information sharing, the CCP believes it needs to be controlled. Since 2003, the government has worked to do so: it constructed a “Great Firewall” by blocking sites, hired “internet police” to delete “problematic” information, and used propaganda and censorship techniques to redirect citizens’ attention toward government-endorsed posts. On foreign policy issues, this censorship has often skewed online opinion toward nationalist, xenophobic viewpoints. As these posts dominate Internet forums, they can escalate citizens’ opinions, making them increasingly nationalist. The government claims that these extreme nationalist public opinions force it to take a hard line on foreign relations; to avoid domestic protest, it must appease citizens by showing China’s strength and denouncing foreign nations.
While Susan Shirk and Bob Chen defend this claim, Yun Sun offers a competing perspective. He argues that the government intentionally escalates online opinion in order to foster nationalism, legitimize one-party rule, and justify inflexibility in international relations. These different interpretations of the government’s intention draws the question: does the Chinese government deliberately skew online opinion toward extreme views, or has censorship instead had unintended, and potentially negative effects? Examining the September 2012 Sino-Japan conflict over the Diaoyu Islands provides insight into this question: the government seemed first to use censorship to promote nationalism online, and then to sanction the nationwide anti-Japan protests that resulted. As the government was able to promote both domestic and foreign policy goals as it did so suggests that nationalist propaganda censorship, at least in this case, operated as it intended.
Although officials in China do not require public support for reelection, they still consider public opinion crucial. Without knowing citizens’ concerns, the government cannot anticipate rising popular dissent. If it is unprepared for protest, the government may respond too slowly to dismantle resistance when it begins.[1] Being informed on public opinion is thus essential to maintaining political stability and continued CCP control.[2] With the introduction of the Internet, knowing this “public opinion” became increasingly important. When people discuss political issues, they can exacerbate each other’s concerns. The internet broadens this effect: information posted online can quickly spread throughout the country, enabling citizens to communicate their opinions to a greater audience. As a result, the Internet can potentially bring individuals’ concerns into national consciousness, and in turn spur mass protest about them.[3] Xiao Qiang affirms, “negative reports” are “exposed and nationally distributed through the internet, and can resonate broadly in society.”[4] The Internet thus both escalates citizens’ opinions and provides a platform for them to organize.
Because of these potential effects, the Chinese government considers controlling online “public opinion” crucial to maintaining political stability. At the fourth plenary session in 2004, the CCP Central Committee outlined its need for this Internet control:
As the number of Web users has grown and political consciousness has risen, the influence of online political participation on actual politics has become broader and deeper. There is an urgent need, therefore, to better systematize and regulate the behavior of online political participation.[5]
The government first worked to censor the Internet by constructing the so-called “Great Firewall” of China, blocking sites, themes, and words from Chinese Internet.[6] As citizens resisted these censors, the government increased its efforts. In 2008, President Hu Jintao described the government’s new objective; instead of “managing” online content, he said, the government must work to “use” the Internet, “actively setting the agenda” for major breaking stories online.[7] Rather than just blocking content, therefore, the government worked to shift the appearance of the information that exists online, directing citizens’ away from “problematic” opinions and toward government-endorsed ones. The author of The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser, relates, the aim of online censorship became not “so much to blot out unsavory information, as to alter the physics around it”; “rather than banning certain words or opinions outright,” he says, censorship increasingly focuses on “the manipulation of curation, context, and the flow of information and attention.”[8]
The government worked to “alter the physics” around information by adding three layers of censorship to its “Firewall”: first, it issues guidelines about what topics “netizens” can discuss and arrests those that violate them; second, its “internet police” deletes “problematic” sites or posts that surface despite the Firewall and threats; third, the “police” leaves online posts that reflect the government’s position and adds “correct” opinion, disguised as citizens’ comments.[9] The first step encourages self-censorship, the second actively censors, and the third uses propaganda to direct attention toward government-endorsed content. By combining blocks, censors, and deletions with propaganda, the CCP central committee argues, its system makes it so that “positive public opinion has the upper hand on the Internet.”[10] While it cannot censorall “negative” information, Pariser says it does not have to; as the government is able to “create friction for problematic information and to route public attention to pro-government forums,” he argues, it can still “manipulate the truth.”[11]
“Crowd-sourced” propaganda and “public opinion channeling” are two methods the government
has developed to promote “correct” opinion online. “Crowd-sourced” propaganda leaves or amasses citizens’ posts that reflect the government’s position, so that, as Global Voices blogger Bob Chen says, “public opinion is partially shown.”[12] With some controversial issues, the government has created online “public forums” for citizens to voice their opinions.[13] As the CCP sponsors these forums, citizens are hesitant to provide a competing view; citizens that post thus typically share the government’s position, concentrating “correct” citizens’ opinions online. With other issues, the CCP deletes most posts discussing the topic, leaving only those that reflect its opinion uncensored. This selective deletion gives the impression that the public largely supports its position. Crowd-sourced propaganda thus uses citizens’ statements to promote the government’s opinion. Pariser writes, “rather than just telling Chinese citizens what to think, it lift[s] the voices…aligned with the state.[14]
“Public opinion channeling” shapes online public opinion by portraying propaganda as citizens’ comments.[15] Dubbed by journalists as “grabbing the microphone,” this method adds CCP-endorsing messages to online blogs.[16] With the “fifty-cent army,” for example, the government pays citizens fifty cents for each message they post online that supports the CCP on controversial issues.[17] By adding posts, public opinion channeling can increase the proportion of “positive” posts online.
As it promotes “correct” information and guides online commentary, the government is able to select the dominant opinions online.[18] This “manufacturing of opinion,” as News Line deems it, distorts the information that citizens read and react to.[19] People who repeatedly see the same story begin to believe it. Moreover, we have a natural tendency to side with the majority unless it directly contradicts our viewpoint. By crafting an online opinion that aligns with its position, therefore, the government can gain citizens’ support, and in turn prevent protest. Susan Shirk writes, it can “put social and psychological pressure to conform on people with critical views, and thereby presumably reduce the possibility of antigovernment collective action.”[20]
Yet in foreign policy, this propaganda censorship seems to have backfired, forcing the government to sacrifice either domestic or foreign interests. Fear of government backlash can prevent people from posting opinions online until they know the government’s position on an issue. Shirk explains, “posting one’s opinions online carries some danger of being flagged by the CCP as a potential troublemaker, so people concerned about their own careers are cautious about doing so.”[21] Aware of the government’s Internet censorship, citizens have begun to discern the CCP’s position by noting which topics remain uncensored and searchable online; if the CCP does not approve of an opinion, the “Internet Police” will delete posts that advocate it. When an opinion circulates online, thus, it indicates government approval. As a result, moderate citizens who may otherwise have remained silent on the issue are more likely to comment on its, and strongly opinionated citizens, who may have tempered their comments, are more likely to issue extreme statements.
In stories about the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and Tibet, the government has used propaganda censorship to concentrate nationalist opinion online, while censoring moderate and anti-Chinese ones.[22] As these viewpoints circulate in internet forums, they resonate with hyper-nationalist citizens, and encourage them to comment. The World Socialist Website identifies these hyper-nationalists as Chinese capitalists, also known as “the new upper middle class” or “power second generation.” This “power second generation,” it says “have a dream of China becoming a world power, enriching themselves, and they regard the existing powers, especially Japan and the US, as obstacles to their ambitions.”[23] As these citizens comment on nationalist-skewed forums, they thus elevate the sentiments, promoting intense Chinese patriotism and denouncing foreigners.
Combined with government censorship, these posts make extreme nationalist viewpoints dominate online forums, which deters citizens from posting competing opinions. David Wertime, cofounder of Tea Leaf Nation, explains, “while netizens who agree with the prevailing opinion rush in, those who disagree begin to leave. It’s not fun being the voice of reason in an increasingly ugly discussion”; in a sense, “the rhetorical punching bag [goes] mute.”[24] Posts such as “we will get revenge” or “we should not be gentle, we should use violence against violence,” for instance, do not simply express an opinion; they discourage debate and response.[25]
Yet as people with opposing viewpoints self-censor, there is a spiraling effect on online public opinion; no longer confronted with other positions, nationalist citizens become increasingly polarized, which in turn begins to make them intolerant of any other viewpoints. Wertime notes, “as sentiment begins to tilt, it tilts further and faster the more extreme it becomes” “to ever more outrageous opinions.”[26] Even moderate opinions such as a desire for cooperation with foreign nations or tolerance of foreigners in China can become intolerable, as can the citizens that express them. Wertime concludes, “the Internet’s perverse game mechanics…creates an atmosphere of hostility both for countervailing views, and for the people/groups who are the targets of those words.”[27] As the government uses propaganda censorship to tailor online forums to only nationalist opinion, it creates a platform for extreme nationalists to voice their opinions and speak to one another, spurring strong patriotism and intense xenophobia online.
Even as the government manipulates online opinion, it continues to associate it with “public opinion.” Gang and Bandurski note, “despite the fact that the CCP continues to punish editors who step over the line and the media remain formally part of the party-state apparatus, China’s leaders are beginning to treat the media and Internet as the voice of the public.”[28] If hyper-nationalist, xenophobic sentiments dominate online forums, thus, the CCP deems “public opinion” fiercely patriotic and anti-foreign. Shirk confirms, government officials “come away with an impression that nationalist ardor is sweeping the country.”[29] If they neglect this public, they argue, its anger could turn on them, undermining their authority and potentially spurring protest.[30] When the CCP has failed to appease citizens in the past, Shirk explains, online opinion “criticized the government for being too accommodating in foreign policy,” redirecting its anger from foreigners to the party.[31]
The CCP therefore claims that to maintain stability, it must echo online nationalism in press conferences and assert itself in foreign relations. For instance, a Chinese official justified the CCP’s criticism of Western media in 2008, by arguing, “we had to. The people on the Internet weren’t just criticizing the bias of the Western media; they were criticizing us for allowing it.”[32] This statement implies that the government must draw a hard line in foreign policy, but it would like to compromise. Shirk defends this explanation: the government feels forced, she says, “to take a tough stand to defend itself from online criticism that [it fears] might turn into something even more politically threatening.”[33]
If the CCP feels forced to choose between protecting domestic interests and promoting foreign
ones, it suggests that propaganda censorship has spiraled out of the government’s control. Global Voices Blogger Bob Chen writes, “the information survived the censorship, the mainstream opinion is now bearing enmity against those sprung the insurgence.”[34] While the government intended to foster nationalism in the public, after removing censors, the Chinese patriotism remained, “the information survived,” so that the public, “mainstream opinion,” and the government, “those sprung the insurgence,” now clash. Shirk agrees: forced to sacrifice foreign policy goals to appease the public, Chinese leaders “maintain their popularity at home but put new obstacles in the way of achieving other objectives in their relations with” foreign nations; “nationalist public opinion blows back on the foreign policy process.”[35] If the hyper-nationalist public forces the government to choose between foreign relations and domestic stability, nationalist propaganda censorship appears not to have operated according to the government’s intent.
Yet Yun Sun, a writer for the Brookings Institution, challenges this conclusion. He argues that the government orchestrates extreme nationalist views and uses them to forward domestic and foreign interests. “Information received by the general public-and the ensuing discussion about it-are decided, colored, and shaped by the authorities,” he says, so “it is extremely difficult to argue that the resulting public sentiment is not…manufactured by the government.”[36] According to Sun, the government intentionally escalates nationalism online, and at times even allows it to spiral into anti-foreign protest; by enabling citizens to express and act on these extreme views, the government provides a “safety valve” for pent up frustrations. Especially this decade, corruption, high prices, and unequal socioeconomic statuses have worsened the government’s reputation among citizens.[37] Expressing xenophobic sentiment online or in protests enables the public to vent frustrations before they turn on the government.[38] Sun affirms, “appealing to nationalism is an easy way to score points with the public. This may be especially true in China, where much of the society still carries a victim mentality left over from” the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ when it was dominated by foreign countries.[39]
Moreover, as Chinese citizens now watch and read about democratic elections in other nations, they can become resentful of China’s one-party system. Sun confirms, “lacking the periodic reaffirmation of its mandate to rule,” as through elections, “the government always needs ways to reaffirm its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.”[40] Pariser suggests that fostering nationalism provides a way to “legitimize the Chinese government’s position” for citizens.[41]
Finally, Sun argues that the government’s “tough stand” on foreign relations forwards its interests, rather than countering them. He writes, “stirring up domestic public opinion helps Beijing to strengthen tough policy positions abroad and serves as leverage in negotiating concessions from foreign governments.”[42] Rather than preventing the CCP from compromising on foreign relations, thus, extreme nationalist online opinion gives it “leverage” in foreign relations.
These claims suggest that we should reassess the cause-effect relationship between the CCP’s hard-line on foreign relations and nationalist online opinion.[43] Rather than being forced to react to extreme nationalist online opinion in foreign relations, could the CCP actually cause this opinion so that it can justify its inflexibility? If so, propaganda censorship would enable the government to calm domestic frustrations, gain legitimacy, and strengthen its position in foreign relations. By this view, hyper-nationalist online opinion reflects the government’s intentions.
So, does the government intend to escalate nationalist opinion online, as Sun suggests, or does the opinion spiral out of its control, forcing it to act, as the government, Chen, and Shirk claim? Put in another way, when the government takes a “tough stand” on foreign policy, has it orchestrated nationalist online as it hopes, or has censorship forced it to choose between domestic and foreign interests? Examining these questions in light of Japan’s September 2012 purchase of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands and the anti-Japanese protests that erupted in China as a result provides one possible answer.
On September 10, 2012, Japan purchased the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a territory that has been disputed between China and Japan since WWII.[44] Soon after Japan announced its purchase, nationalist, anti-Japan sentiments began to dominate online blogs. While citizens successfully resist censors, these comments seemed to reflect propaganda censorship more than resistance; moderate and pacifist comments were deleted, while hundreds of nationalist blogs surfaced, remained online, and were accessible with keyword searches. Global Voices Blogger Oiwan Lam notes, “everything politically sensitive…is usually censored on the Chinese Internet. However, one hot topic allowed to emerge over the past few days has been the Diaoyu Islands conflict.”[45] Searches for “protect Diaoyu,” “Diaoyu Islands,” and “anti-Japan,” for instance, remained open on Tencent QQ and Sina Weibo, two main Chinese blogs.[46] And Oiwan Lam says that on Sina Weibo, if you searched, “beat up Japan” or “war with Japan,” “a new blog pops up almost every second.”[47] As “beat up” and “war” suggest, online posts generalized from the island conflict to Japanese resentment. Over the following week, comments became increasingly xenophobic, eventually spiraling into calls for boycotts of Japanese goods and anti-Japanese protests. As these posts remained uncensored, citizens could successfully turn their words into action: on September 15, citizens in Beijing took to the streets, and over the next three days, protests spread to over 80 Chinese cities.[48]
Until September 17, searches like “anti-Japan protest” and “protest Diaoyu” remained open on major blogs, and “protest” and “crushing” were even on Sina Weibo’s “hot topic” list.[49] The posts that “disappeared” were instead those that criticized the protests and their violence, denouncing Chinese attacks on Japanese citizens or destroyed storefronts, for instance.[50] Photos of the protests similarly were uncensored unless they showed violence.[51] Both before and during these protests, online censorship suggested government support.
State-run media also indicated government approval of online opinion and the protests. State-run media are the most tightly censored in China. As a result, citizens consider their statements indicative of the government’s position on issues. Before the protests, state-run media cited government members, scholars, and organizations who denounced Japan and affirmed China’s right to the islands. And the tone of reports echoed the nationalist, anti-Japan comments in blogs, deeming Japan’s actions a “farce” or “so-called” “purchase,” for instance. These articles seemed at the least to affirm extreme nationalism, and at most, to fuel it.
After the protests began, state-run media commended citizens’ actions, showing “sympathy” for the “patriotic” protesters. Chinese Blogger Hu Zimei relates, “the state-controlled media and opinion leaders consider the violent protests as radical expression of patriotism.”[52] For instance, People’s Daily, considered the “mouthpiece” of the CCP, published an editorial that read, “no one would doubt the pulses of patriotic fervor when the motherland is bullied…A people that has no guts and courage is doomed to be bullied, and a country that always hides low and bides its time will always come under attack.”[53] Beyond supporting the protests, People’s Daily implied that if citizens had not acted, they would have made China seem week, showing “no guts and courage.” Finally, state-run newspapers printed photos of the protests in bright colors on their front pages.[54] State newspapers rarely show any photos of protests; these thus seemed not only to sanction the protests, but actually to celebrate them. New York Times’s Jane Perlez argues these articles and photos “were evidence that senior leaders approved of the demonstrations,” or that “they were even organized by the government.”[55] According to Washington Post’s William Wan, Chinese journalists have confirmed this claim: two related that “propaganda officials” gave them instructions to report the demonstrations from a nationalist, patriotic angle, while remaining silent on violence.[56]
Finally, police action during the protests indicated CCP approval. In the past, the police have shut down protests almost immediately, no matter their scale, and punished those involved; in many cases, they have arrested citizens both for actively protesting and for considering protesting, by commenting on activist blogs.[57]
Yet in these demonstrations, the police seemed to either passive toward or encouraging of the protests. As one blogger watched protests in Beijing turn violent, he commented, “this is really creepy. Given the stability maintenance capabilities that the Party State has developed over the years, how can the smashing and grabbing of this ugly scale possibly happen?”[58] Citizens in cities with smaller protests similarly wondered at the police’s inaction. Blogger Hu Zimei, related “something is wrong…the total number of participants are not too many but the protests are rather destructive…The riot police are not prepared.”[59]
Other citizens said the police seemed to egg on the demonstrations. Two journalists reported that policemen dressed in normal clothing directed them toward a place where they could “more effectively” protest.[60] And in Beijing, the police actually divided crowds into groups, guided each to the Japanese embassy for its “turn” to protest, and even provided lunch for some people while they waited.[61] According to C. Custer, editor of the blog “ChinaGeeks,” they did not even stop violence; in fact, rather than preventing it, policemen appeared to be looking for citizens that were photographing violence, and then destroying their cameras.[62]
Nationalist-skewed online opinion, state-media praise for protesters’, and the police’s passivity and encouragement suggest that the government at least sanctioned the protests, and may even had a role in organizing them. Shi Yinhong, a professor at Renmin University, argues, if the government “consciously opposed” or “resolutely didn’t want” these demonstrations, “then there would be nothing.”[63] Custer strengthens this statement: “if you think that China doesn’t have the law enforcement capability to totally shut down these riots, you’re delusional.”[64]
In fact, he suggests, China’s actions suggested that the government wanted protest:
The evidence that China is turning a blind eye to these protests is overwhelming. The absence of China’s police forces is glaringly obvious,…China has clearly shown it is more than capable of keeping anti-Japan protests under control if it wants to. The obvious conclusion now-the only conclusion now-is that it doesn’t want to.”[65]
The aftermath of the protests lends support to Custer and Yinhong’s claims. After September 17, when protesters attacked the Japanese embassy, state media articles began to shift tone, now calling for “patriotism” with “restraint,” and “rational and lawful” nationalism.[66] Many state-run media articles that supported the protests and vilified Japan were deleted from online archives, as were similar posts in online blogs, and searches for anti-Japan, Diaoyu, and similar searches were blocked online.[67] Finally, the police cracked down on protesters, and in Beijing, the government issued text messages warning citizens to stop protest.[68] With these actions, the government was able to stop the nationwide protests within two days, which again suggests that it chose to allow them to spread and continue as long as they did.
In this case, therefore, the CCP appears to have successfully manipulated online opinion, and maintained control of the public even as extreme nationalist opinions spread online and citizens took to the streets. Political analyst Liu Junning confirms, “the party is skilled at manipulating” the public, and the “signs that these demonstrations were organized by the government is very high…the protests come when the leaders need one to come, and the protests will stop when they want them to stop.”[69]
There is no definitive evidence for why the government provoked online nationalism and the subsequent protests. However, the protests did appear to strengthen China’s position on the Diaoyu Island dispute with Japan. Japan is heavily reliant on China for exports, and many Japanese companies run through China.[70] During the protests, many Japanese manufacturers and storeowners had to shut down plants and shops, as protesters threatened them.[71] New York Times’s Ian Johnson and Tom Shanker suggest that, combined with calls for Japanese boycotts, these attacks encouraged Japan to back down on foreign policy.[72] By showing Japan that it could mobilize Chinese citizens against it and potentially jeopardize its trade, China forced it to re-enter negotiations on the Diaoyu Islands. Even as he called for “peaceful” negotiations and the end to violence, Chinese defense chief Liang Guanglie indicated this threat: China “reserves the right to take further actions.”[73]
Thus, this case study seems to support Sun’s claims. China appears to have at least sanctioned, if not orchestrated, public opinion and action. Online censorship did spur extreme nationalist sentiment; however, this sentiment did not appear to “force” the government to sacrifice on foreign policy; to the contrary, as Sun indicates, it seemed to forward domestic and foreign goals.
[1] Shirk, Susan L. “Changing Media, Changing China.” In Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 17.
[2] Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing China,” 17.
[3] Pariser, Eli. The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think. New York, NY: Penguin Books/Penguin Press, 2012.
And Correspondent from China. “Chinese Media on War Footing.” World Socialist Web Site. January 28, 2013. https://wsws.org/en/articles/2013/01/28/chin-j28.html.
[4]Qiang, Xiao. “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and its Political Impact.” In Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 217.
[5] Bandurski, David, comp. Grabbing the Reins of “Online Political Participation.” China Media Project. Journalism & Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong. January 12, 2010. http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/01/12/.
[6] MacKinnon, Rebecca. “Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship and Civic Discourse in China.” Public Choice 134, no. 1-2 (August 9, 2007): doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9199-0.
[7] Gang, Qian, and David Bandurski. “China’s Emerging Public Sphere.” In Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 55-56.
[8] Eli Pariser, 139.
[9] Sun, Yun. “Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?” In Brookings Northeast
Asia Commentary, compiled by Brookings Institution. Vol. 50. Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS). http://brookings.edu/research/opinions/.
[10] David Bandurski, Grabbing the Reins of “Online Political Participation.”
[11] Eli Pariser, 139 and 141.
[12] Chen, Bob. “China: Patriotism Triggered, Though under Censorship.” Global Voices. March 19, 2008. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/03/19.
[13] Eli Pariser 63. And Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy.” In Changing Media, Changing China, ed. by Susan L. Shirk, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 241.
[14] Eli Pariser, 138.
[15] Qian Gang and David Bandurski, 55-56.
[16] Ibid, 55-56.
[17] Bandurski, David. Managing the Hazards of Online Society. China Media Project- Journalism & Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong. May 13, 2013. http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/05/13/.
[18] Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing China,” 6.
[19] Ibid, 6.
[20] Ibid, 15.
[21] Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” 241.
[22] Ford, Peter. “China Blocks YouTube, Reporters over Tibet News.” Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 2008. http://csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2008/.
[23] Correspondent from China for World Socialist Website.
[24] Wertime, David. “Lessons From China’s Online Hatred.” Tea Leaf Nation, May 25, 2013. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/05.
[25] Peter Ford. “China Blocks YouTube, Reporters over Tibet News.”
[26] David Wertime. “Lesson’s from China’s Online Hatred.”
[27] Ibid.
[28] Gang and Bandurski, 39.
[29] Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” 226-227.
[30] Yun Sun.
[31] Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing China,” 28.
[32] Susan Shirk. “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” 247.
[33] Ibid, 247.
[34] Bob Chen.
[35]Susan Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing China,” 28, And “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy,” 247.
[36] Yun Sun.
[37] Associated Press. “China Allows Rowdy Anti-Japanese Protests.” FOXNews, October 18, 2010. http://foxnews.com/world/.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Yun Sun.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Pariser, 63.
[42] Yun Sun.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Japan calls the islands “Sekaku” and has claimed rights to them since WWII. China calls them “Diaoyu,” and says it has owned them since “Ancient times.” The Islands are uninhabited, but are positioned close to important trade lanes, and have rich mineral supplies. While Japan indicated that planned to purchase the islands in Apr. 2012, it officially acted in Sept. 2012, after Sino-Japanese relations worsened. For more information, see:
BBC News. “Q&A: China-Japan Islands Row.” April 29, 2013. http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific. And,
McDonald, Mark. “East Asia’s Sea Disputes: Scar Tissue from War Wounds.” International Herald Tribune, August 16, 2012, Global ed., http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/.
[45] Lam, Oiwan. “In Sea of Censorship, China Allows Anti-Japan War Vitriol.” Global Voices (weblog), September 14, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/14/.
[46] China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 68. Freedom House. September 20, 2012. http://freedomhouse.org.
And Oiwan Lam. “In Sea of Censorship, China Allows Anti-Japan War Vitriol.”
[47] Oiwan Lam. “In Sea of Censorship, China Allows Anti-Japan War Vitriol.”
[48] Perlez, Jane. “News Analysis: In Crisis With Japan, China Adjusts Strategy but Does Not Back Down.” Cont, Bree Feng. New York Times, September 30, 2012. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
[49] Lam, Oiwan. “China: Censor Machine Suspended for Anti-Japan Mobilization?” Global Voices (weblog), September 16, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/16/.
[50] Wan, William. “Chinese Government Both Encourages and Reins in Anti-Japan Protests, Analysts Say.” Cont.
Liu Liu and Zhang Jie. Washington Post, September 19, 2012. http://washingtonpost.com/world/.
[51] Associated Press FOXNews. And Oiwan Lam. “China: Censor Machine Suspended for Anti-Japan Mobilization?”
[52] Oiwan Lam. “China: Censor Machine Suspended for Anti-Japan Mobilization?”
[53] Johnson, Ian, and Thom Shanker. “Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japan Protests.” New York Times. September 17, 2012, New York ed., A4. http://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/.
[54] Jane Perlez.
[55] Ibid.
[56] William Wan.
[57] William Wan. And Custer, C. “Yang Rui, etc.” Translation and Analysis of Modern China. May 18, 2012. ChinaGeeks. http://chinageeks.org/2012/05/.
[58] Gao, Jing. “Chinese Media Praise Hong Kong Activists’ Landing on Disputed Diaoyu Islands…with Censorship.” Ministry of Tofu, August 16, 2012. http://ministryoftofu.com/2012/08/.
[59] Oiwan Lam. “China: Censor Machine Suspended for Anti-Japan Mobilization?”
[60] William Wan.
[61] Jane Perlez.
[62] Lam, Oiwan. “China: Protesters Arrested for Human Rights Banner at Anti-Japan Rally.” Global Voices (weblog),
September 17, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/17.
[63] Associated Press, FOX News.
[64] Custer, C. “China’s Anti-Japan Riots Are State-Sponsored. Period.” ChinaGeeks (web log), September 17, 2012. http://chinageeks.org/2012/09/.
[65] Oiwan Lam. “China: Protesters Arrested for Human Rights Banner.”
[66] China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 68. And Associated Press, FOXNews.
[67] C. Custer. “China’s Anti-Japan Riots are State-Sponsored. Period.”
[68] Ibid.
[69] William Wan.
[70] Xinhua News. “‘Purchase’ of Diaoyu Islands Could Cost Japan.” September 13, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/.
And Danlu, Tang, ed. “Japan’s “theft” of Diaoyu Islands Risks China-Japan Economic, Trade Ties.” Editorial. Xinhua News. September 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/.
[71] Xinhua News. “Diaoyu Islands Rift Takes Toll on China-Japan Economic, Trade Ties.” September 25, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/.
[72] Ian Johnson and Tom Shanker.
[73] Xinhua News. “Chinese Defense Chief Hopes to Peacefully Settle Diaoyu Islands Issue, but Warns of ‘further Actions.’” September 18, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/.
Sources Consulted:
Abby. “China Blames ‘Foreign Forces’ For Press Freedom Protests.” Global Voices Online (weblog), January 8, 2013. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/01/08/chinas-blames-foreign-forces-for-press-freedom-protests/.
Abby. “China’s Media Mute on Local School Tragedy.” Global Voices Online (weblog), December 17, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/12/17/chinas-media-mute-on-local-school-tragedy/.
Agence France-Presse. “China Top Censor’s New Leadership Role Raises Fears.” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2012. http://scmp.com/news/china/article/1084200/china-top-censors-new-leadership-role-raises-fears.
Associated Press. “China Allows Rowdy Anti-Japanese Protests.” FOXNews, October 18, 2010. http://foxnews.com/world/2010/10/18/china-allows-rowdy-anti-japanese-protests/.
Bandurski, David, comp. Grabbing the Reins of ‘online Political Participation’ Journalism & Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong. China Media Project. January 12, 2010. http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/01/12/3785/.
Bandurski, David. Managing the Hazards of Online Society. Journalism and Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong. China Media Project. May 13, 2013. http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/05/13/33042/.
BBC News. “Q&A: China-Japan Islands Row.” April 29, 2013. http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139.
Bennett, Isabella. Council on Foreign Relations: Media Censorship in China. Report. January 24, 2013. http://cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515.
Bradsher, Keith. “In Latest Crackdown, China Toughens Rules on Internet Users.” New York Times, December 29, 2012, New York ed., Asia Pacific (A4). http://nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/asia/china-toughens-restrictions-on-internet-use.html.
Bradsher, Keith, Martin Fackler, and Andrew Jacobs. “In Cities Across China, Protests Erupt Against Japan Over Disputed Island.” New York Times, August 20, 2012, Late (East Coast) ed. Proquest.
Chao, Loretta. “U.S. Boosts Web Freedom Efforts in China, Iran.” The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703961104576148174253905418.html.
Chen, Bob. “China: Patriotism Triggered, Though under Censorship.” Global Voices. March 19, 2008. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/03/19/chinapatriotism-triggered-though-under-censorship/.
China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 68, Netizens Suspect Official Hand, Oppose Violence in Anti-Japan Protests. Freedom House. September 20, 2012. http://freedomhouse.org/cmb/68_092012.
China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 78. Freedom House. January 24, 2013. http://freedomhouse.org/cmb/78_012413.
Correspondent from China. “Chinese Media on War Footing.” Online Posting. January 28, 2013. World Socialist Website. https://wsws.org/en/articles/2013/01/28/chin-j28.html.
Custer, C. “China’s Anti-Japan Riots Are State-Sponsored. Period.” ChinaGeeks (weblog), September 17, 2012. http://chinageeks.org/2012/09/chinas-anti-japan-riots-are-state-sponsored-period/.
Custer, C. “Yang Rui, Etc.” Translation and Analysis of Modern China. ChinaGeeks (weblog), May 18, 2012. http://chinageeks.org/2012/05/yang-rui-and-reflections-on-participation/.
Danlu, Tang, ed. “China, Japan Hold Consultations on Diaoyu Islands.” Xinhua News (Beijing), September 25, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872241.htm.
Danlu, Tang, ed. “Japanese PM’s Attempt to Confuse World at UN over Diaoyu Islands Doomed to Fail.” Editorial. Xinhua News, September 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/24/c_131869948.htm.
Danlu, Tang, ed. “Japan’s ‘theft’ of Diaoyu Islands Risks China-Japan Economic, Trade Ties.” Editorial. Xinhua News, September 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/24/c_131870020.htm.
Danlu, Tang, ed. “Japan Blamed for Consequence Caused by Illegally “buying” Diaoyu Islands, Says FM.” Xinhua News (Beijing), September 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/24/c_131869949.htm.
“Deleted Post Criticizes Party Privilege – China Media Project.” The Anti-Social List: Deleted Posts on Sina Weibo. September 27, 2012. CMP Newswire. http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/27/27607/.
Deleted Post Criticizes Party Privilege. Journalism and Media Studies Centre of the University of Hong Kong. China Media Project. September 27, 2012. http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/27/27607/.
Duo, Yi. “”Self-immolation Guide”: Desperate Insanity of the Dalai Clique.” Chen Zi, ed. Xinhua News, March 6, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-03/06/c_132213731.htm.
Epstein, Gady, comp. The Machinery of Control, Cat and Mouse: How China Makes Sure Its Internet Abides by the Rules. Special Report. Print ed. Vol. April. China and the Internet. Economist Limited, 2013. http://economist.com/news/special-report/21574629-how-china-makes-sure-its-internet-abides-rules-cat-and-mouse.
Ford, Peter. “As China’s Social Media Takes Off, Beijing’s Censorship Campaign Heats up.” The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 2013. http://csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0515/As-China-s-social-media-takes-off-Beijing-s-censorship-campaign-heats-up.
Ford, Peter. “China Blocks YouTube, Reporters over Tibet News.” Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 2008. http://csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2008/0318/p06s02-woap.html.
Ford, Peter. “Weibos: China Clamps down on Popular Microblogs.” The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 2012. http://csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/0226/Weibos-China-clamps-down-on-popular-microblogs/.
Ford, Peter. “Why a Nervous China Aims to Shield Citizens from Egypt News.” The Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 2011. http://csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0201/Why-a-nervous-China-aims-to-shield-citizens-from-Egypt-news/.
Funakoshi, Minami. “From Chinese and Japanese Web Users, Strikingly Similar Vitriol on Islands Dispute.” Tea Leaf Nation, January 23, 2013. http://tealeafnation.com/2013/01/from-chinese-and-japanese-web-users-strikingly-similar-vitriol-on-islands-dispute/.
Gang, Qian, and David Bandurski. “China’s Emerging Public Sphere: The Impact of Media Commercialization, Professionalism, and the Internet in an Era of Transition.” In Changing Media, Changing China, edited by Susan L. Shirk, 38-76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Gao, Jing. “Chinese Media Praise Hong Kong Activists’ Landing on Disputed Diaoyu Islands…with Censorship.” Ministry of Tofu: News and Articles of China’s Social Justice, People’s Lives, and Mentality, August 16, 2012. http://ministryoftofu.com/2012/08/chinese-media-praise-hong-kong-activists-landing-on-disputed-diaoyu-islandswith-censorship/.
Guangcheng, Chen. “How China Flouts Its Laws.” Editorial. The New York Times, May 29, 2012, U.S. ed., Opinion Pages sec. http://nytimes.com/2012/05/30/opinion/how-china-flouts-its-laws.html.
Huang, Cary. “President Xi Jinping Issues Call for Regional Stability.” South China Morning Post, April 8, 2013. http://scmp.com/news/china/article/1209104/xi-jinping-urges-zero-tolerance-asia-troublemakers.
Jingsheng, Wei. “Ai Weiwei Arrest: Why No One in China Is Safe from Those in Power.” The Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 2011. http://csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2011/0421/Ai-Weiwei-arrest-Why-no-one-in-China-is-safe-from-those-in-power/.
Jingsheng, Wei. “Blocking ‘peaceful Evolution’ Will Lead to Instability in China.” Interview by Nathan Gardels. The Christian Science Monitor. October 19, 2010. http://csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/1019/Blocking-peaceful-evolution-will-lead-to-instability-in-China/.
Johnson, Ian, and Jane Perlez. “A Chinese Leader Returns Amid Tumult.” Cont. John Ansfield. New York Times, September 16, 2012, National ed., A16 sec. http://nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/asia/xi-jinping-returns-amid-tumult-in-china.html?_r=1.
Johnson, Ian, and Thom Shanker. “Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japan Protests.” New York Times, September 17, 2012, New York ed., A4 sec. http://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/anti-japanese-protests-over-disputed-islands-continue-in-china.html?smid=tw-share.
Lagerkvist, John. “The Rise of Online Public Opinion in the People’s Republic of China.” China: An International Journal 3, no. 1 (March 2005): 119-30. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v003/3.1lagerkvist.html.
Lam, Oiwan. “China: Censor Machine Suspended for Anti-Japan Mobilization?” Global Voices (weblog), September 16, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/16/china-censor-machine-suspended-for-anti-japan-mobilization/.
Lam, Oiwan. “China: Protesters Arrested for Human Rights Banner at Anti-Japan Rally.” Global Voices (weblog), September 17, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/17/china-protesters-arrested-for-carrying-wrong-banner-at-anti-japan-rally/.
Lam, Oiwan. “Global Voices English The World Is Talking, Are You Listening?” Global Voices (weblog), September 14, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/14/in-sea-of-censorship-china-allows-anti-japan-war-vitriol/.
Lam, Oiwan. “In Sea of Censorship, China Allows Anti-Japan War Vitriol.” Global Voices (weblog), September 14, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/09/14/in-sea-of-censorship-china-allows-anti-japan-war-vitriol/.
Liang, Bin, and Hong Lu. “Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China.” Journal of Contemporary Justice 26, no. 1 (January 14, 2010): 103-20. doi:10.1177/1043986209350437.
Lin, Lilian. “State Media Survey: It’s the Wealth Gap, Stupid.” The Wall Street Journal: China Real Time Report (web log), November 6, 2012. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/06/state-media-survey-its-the-wealth-gap-stupid/.
Lina, Yang, ed. “China’s Xi Calls ‘purchase’ of Diaoyu Islands ‘a Farce,’ Urges Japan to Stop.” Xinhua News (Beijing), September 19, 2012, English ed., News sec. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/19/c_131860884.htm.
Lu, Yi. “As Recriminations Over Anti-Japanese Protests Mount, Deep Divisions in China Emerge.” Tea Leaf Nation, September 23, 2012. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/09/as-recriminations-over-anti-japanese-protests-mount-deep-divisions-in-china-emerge/.
MacKinnon, Rebecca. “Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship And civic Discourse in China.” Public Choice 134, no. 1-2 (August 9, 2007): 31-46. doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9199-0.
Marquand, Robert. “China’s Media Censorship Rattling World Image.” The Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 2006. http://csmonitor.com/2006/0224/p01s04-woap.html/.
Marrow, Will. “Chinese Government Imposes New Internet Censorship Law.” World Socialist Website. January 7, 2013. https://wsws.org/en/articles/2013/01/07/chin-j07.html.
McDonald, Mark. “East Asia’s Sea Disputes: Scar Tissue from War Wounds.” International Herald Tribune (the Global Edition of the New York Times), August 16, 2012. http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/east-asias-sea-disputes-scar-tissue-from-war-wounds/?gwh=40821AFC4F5FB59D72B53C01A3D0CFEA.
Pariser, Eli. The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think. New York, NY: Penguin Books/Penguin Press, 2012.
Pennington, Clare. “China, Framed by the Cinema and the Web.” The New York Times, September 16, 2012, New York ed., Arts (AR14). http://nytimes.com/2012/09/16/movies/caught-in-the-web-on-web-searches-in-china.html.
People’s Daily. “China’s Defense Ministry Voices Protest to Japan over Diaoyu Islands.” September 12, 2012. http://english.people.com.cn/90786/7946407.html.
People’s Daily. “Japan Urged to Listen to Chinese Public’s Appeal on Diaoyu Islands.” September 18, 2012. http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7951416.html.
People’s Daily. “Overseas Chinese Protest Japan’s Illegal “purchase” of Diaoyu Islands.” September 19, 2012. http://english.people.com.cn/102774/7953922.html.
People’s Daily. “What’s Japan’s Greatest Fear?” September 14, 2012. http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7949512.html.
Perlez, Jane. “Analysis: In Crisis With Japan, China Adjusts Strategy but Does Not Back Down.” Cont. Bree Feng. New York Times, September 30, 2012. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E7D91138F933A0575AC0A9649D8B63.
Qiang, Hou. “Ibet Officials Vow Resolute Fight against Dalai Clique.” Xinhua News, August 3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/08/c_132217999.htm.
Qiang, Xiao. “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact.” In Changing Media, Changing China, edited by Susan L. Shirk, 202-24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Sandra. “Protests Roiling, China’s Mainstream Media Showed an Alternate Reality.” Tea Leaf Nation, September 25, 2012. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/09/protests-roiling-chinas-mainstream-media-showed-an-alternate-reality/.
Schuman, Michael. “Can China’s Economy Thrive with a Censored Internet?” Time, October 26, 2011. http://business.time.com/2011/10/26/can-chinas-economy-thrive-with-a-censored-internet/.
Shasha, Deng, ed. “It’s High Time to Stop Hijacking Tibetans.” Editorial. Xinhua News, March 28, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/28/c_132269530.htm.
Shi, Tianjian. “Public Opinion and Political Change in China by Wenfang Tang.” The China Journal, no. 57 (January 2007): 149-51. http://jstor.org/stable/20066247.
Shirk, Susan L. “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy.” In Changing Media, Changing China, edited by Susan L. Shirk, 225-52. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Shuli, Hu. “The Rise of the Business Media in China.” In Changing Media, Changing China, edited by Susan L. Shirk, 77-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Special Correspondence, New York Times. “Freedom of Press Hailed in China.” New York Times, June 6, 1937, New York ed., Editorials sec. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
Staff, Reuters. “China Clamps down on Internet Restrictions.” The Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 2012. http://csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/1228/China-clamps-down-on-Internet-restrictions?nav=449182-csm_article-bottomRelated.
The State Council Information Office. Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China. Report. Edited by Wang Yuanyuan. Beijing: People’s Republic of China, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152_5.htm.
Sun, Yun. “Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?” In Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, compiled by Brookings Institution. Vol. 50. Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS). http://brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/13-china-public-opinion-sun.
Symonds, Peter. “Former Top Obama Official Warns of ‘powder keg’ in Asia.” World Socialist Website. February 27, 2013. https://wsws.org/en/articles/2013/02/27/camp-f27.html.
Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. “Rising Tension — and Stakes — in Japan-China Island Dispute.” International Herald Tribune (the Global Edition of the New York Times), September 14, 2012. http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/rising-tension-and-stakes-in-japan-china-island-dispute/.
Thomas, Natalie. “As Kerry Visits China, Online Chatter Soon Turns to North Korea’s Nukes.” Tea Leaf Nation, April 15, 2013. http://tealeafnation.com/2013/04/as-kerry-visits-china-online-chatter-soon-turns-to-north-koreas-nukes/.
Wan, William. “Chinese Government Both Encourages and Reins in Anti-Japan Protests, Analysts Say.” Cont. Liu Liu and Zhang Jie. Washington Post, September 19, 2012. http://washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-government-both-encourages-and-reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/53144ff0-00d8-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story_1.html.
Watts, Jonathan. “China’s Secret Internet Police Target Critics with Web of Propaganda.” The Guardian (Beijing), June 13, 2005, U.S. ed., News sec. http://guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/jun/14/newmedia.china.
Wertime, David. “Beijing Welcomes You, Decent Foreigners.” Tea Leaf Nation, June 2, 2012. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/06/beijing-welcomes-you-decent-foreigners/.
Wertime, David. “Chinese Netizens Say Time To ‘Clean Up’ Foreign ‘Trash’” Tea Leaf Nation, May 15, 2012. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/05/chinese-netizens-say-time-to-clean-up-foreign-trash/.
Wertime, David. “Lessons From China’s Online Hatred.” Tea Leaf Nation, May 25, 2013. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/05/lessons-from-chinas-online-hatred/.
Wertime, David. “LN Editor On The Stream: Understanding China’s “Online Patriots”.” Tea Leaf Nation, September 21, 2012. http://tealeafnation.com/2012/09/tln-editor-on-the-stream-understanding-chinas-online-patriots/.
Wines, Michael. “Crackdown on Chinese Bloggers Who Fight the Censors with Puns.” The New York Times, May 29, 2012, New York ed., Asia Pacific (A5). http://nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/asia/china-cracks-down-on-its-cagey-web-critics.html.
Wong, Gloria. “Censorship Meets Rare Defiance as Journalists Strike in China English The World Is Talking, Are You Listening?” Global Voices (weblog), January 8, 2013. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/01/08/censorship-meets-rare-defiance-as-journalists-strike-in-china/.
Woodman, Sophie. “Protests in China: Oppositional, or a Reflection of Faith in the System?” Compiled by Howard Tsang. In Asia Pacific Memo, compiled by Institution of Asian Research. Vol. 150. Origins of Social Protests in China. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia, 2012. http://asiapacificmemo.ca/themes/topic-focused-themes/origins-of-social-protests-in-china.
WuDunn, Sheryl. “Democracy? In China, Write Morality.” The New York Times, April 28, 1989, World ed., Collections: Corruption sec. http://nytimes.com/1989/04/28/world/democracy-in-china-write-morality.html.
Xinhua News. “Commentary: U.S. Should Stop Playing Double Game.” August 30, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/30/c_131817922.htm.
Xinhua News. “Chinese Defense Chief Hopes to Peacefully Settle Diaoyu Islands Issue, but Warns of ‘further Actions’” September 18, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/18/c_131857984.htm.
Xinhua News. “Diaoyu Islands Rift Takes Toll on China-Japan Economic, Trade Ties.” September 25, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/25/c_131872368.htm.
Xinhua News. “‘Purchase’ of Diaoyu Islands Could Cost Japan.” September 13, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/13/c_131849093.htm.
Xinhua News. “Hu States China’s Stance on Japan Ties, Diaoyu Islands.” September 9, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/09/c_131838126.htm.
Yan. “Safeguarding Diaoyu Islands Sovereignty a Long-term Struggle: Official.” Xinhua News (Beijing), September 20, 2012, English ed., News sec. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/20/c_131863508.htm.
Yeo, George, and Eric X. Li. “Rise of the Dragon: China Isn’t Censoring the Internet. It’s Making It Work.” Editorial. The Christian Science Monitor, January 23, 2012. http://csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2012/0123/Rise-of-the-dragon-China-isn-t-censoring-the-Internet.-It-s-making-it-work/(page)/2.
Young, Doug. “Censorship Row Reveals Tolerant Side of China’s New Leadership.” Editorial. CNN, January 14, 2013. http://cnn.com/2013/01/13/opinion/china-censorship-young.
Yunbi, Zhang, Zheng Caixiong, and Zhang Chunyan. “A Day of History and Determination.” People’s Daily, September 19, 2012. http://english.people.com.cn/90882/7952818.html.
ZZN, ed. “Two Japanese Land on Diaoyu Islands: Government.” Xinhua News, September 18, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-09/18/c_131857655.htm.
Zhai, Ivan. “Chinese Netizens Turn to Metaphors to Condemn, Evade Censorship.” South China Morning Post Blogs: Digital Journalism Review (weblog), January 10, 2013. http://scmp.com/comment/blogs/article/1124755/chinese-netizens-turn-metaphors-condemn-evade-censorship.
Melissa Ross 